Ageing rolling stock and new sinalling

Just spotted this story on the BBC technology pages. Can someone tell me which line the carriages on the first picture run on and the first one to say metal ones wins the booby prize. B)


http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32402481

Just spotted this story on the BBC technology pages. Can someone tell me which line the carriages on the first picture run on and the first one to say metal ones wins the booby prize. B)


http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32402481

Possibly USA. The image is in the Thinkstock web site. There appears another photo of this derailment.

Barry

Prof Stupples said he was working with Cranfield University to develop a security system that would tell when a train or other mode of transport was acting oddly.

" said:

Just spotted this story on the BBC technology pages. Can someone tell me which line the carriages on the first picture run on and the first one to say metal ones wins the booby prize. B)


http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32402481

Whenever I bring up the vulnerabilities associated with having the safety critical processing separated from the physical hardware I'm usually dismissed as alarmist.

" said:

" said:

Just spotted this story on the BBC technology pages. Can someone tell me which line the carriages on the first picture run on and the first one to say metal ones wins the booby prize. B)


http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32402481

Whenever I bring up the vulnerabilities associated with having the safety critical processing separated from the physical hardware I'm usually dismissed as alarmist.

It's because in the past, correct me if I'm wrong, you've always talked about it wrt solid state (computer) interlocking, which (I would say) is probably significantly more secure than ETCS, which will potentially have many more attack vectors and entry points.

Interestingly, it sounds to me from that like the researcher was takling about attacking the embedded software on the train itself. I wonder how feasible that would be ­— what does ETCS software run on?

Hackable? You could probably interfere and start pulling things out once past the locked door, maybe insert new cards to "take over" the train. But don't you think the driver and/or passengers may have noticed something amiss - like alarms going off, train coming to a stand because the integrity has been breached and vital stuff missing, trivial stuff like that. After all, we're not in a movie are we...... :laugh:

The “rogue employee” thing seems pretty far-fetched as a new attack vector introduced by a centralized signalling system, IMO. Surely a rogue employee in the signal box would have had a much easier time forty years ago just showing up to work in a signal box alone, walking downstairs with a screwdriver, taking a few bits and pieces out of the bottom of the lever frame, and then routing and signalling one train at full speed straight head-on towards another? Sounds much harder to do when the people are centralized into a big building with lots of other people around who are, even if not explicitly told to be, on the lookout for particularly unusual behaviour.

" said:

The “rogue employee” thing seems pretty far-fetched as a new attack vector introduced by a centralized signalling system, IMO. Surely a rogue employee in the signal box would have had a much easier time forty years ago just showing up to work in a signal box alone, walking downstairs with a screwdriver, taking a few bits and pieces out of the bottom of the lever frame, and then routing and signalling one train at full speed straight head-on towards another? Sounds much harder to do when the people are centralized into a big building with lots of other people around who are, even if not explicitly told to be, on the lookout for particularly unusual behaviour.

With certain styles of lock as fitted to certain types of frame it could be even easier than that. Most boxes on the Great Northern main line had an object secreted about the place for the specific purpose of releasing electric locks if you'd got yourself boxed up in some way. At the risk of saying too much about how it could be done, the report into the Connington South derailment of 1967 http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/MoT_Connington1967.pdf gives a good description. (There is a belief among some old-time staff that the signalman there was trying to see if he could get the points over & back again between the bogies of the train.) Modern systems, of course, record everything that happens so the mystery Lt Col McNaughton encountered at Connington would be pretty-much cleared up by the time RAIB got to the scene. Not what you want if you're trying to cause that sort of foul-up.

There are a few reports around the 50s and 60s where the investigator is quite clearly beside himself with rage, but remains reserved as he must, because of deliberate irregularities with the signal working.

Colonel McMullen is a case in point. They make for fascinating reading.

That's pretty bad. I hope they've improved security since then.

" said:

There are a few reports around the 50s and 60s where the investigator is quite clearly beside himself with rage, but remains reserved as he must, because of deliberate irregularities with the signal working.

Colonel McMullen is a case in point. They make for fascinating reading.

Are there particular reports you have in mind?

A co-worker of an Amtrak tower operator I know had a signal maintainer's key and knew how to open up the US&S Model 14 interlocking machines and disable the time/approach locking. He would do this occasionally when he made a mistake and didn't want to delay the train waiting for the timer to run down.

" said:

A co-worker of an Amtrak tower operator I know had a signal maintainer's key and knew how to open up the US&S Model 14 interlocking machines and disable the time/approach locking. He would do this occasionally when he made a mistake and didn't want to delay the train waiting for the timer to run down.

A slightly different case but...

The Style L (miniature lever) frames between Clapham Junction and Purley all had some kind of approach locking on the signals, but no timeout. Once you'd pulled the lever and the signal cleared you were (ahem) somewhat up the creek. But there was specific authority for the S&T technicians to release the lever backlock on the signalman's verbal request. The one time I saw it done (Clapham B one afternoon) it took a good deal less than 2 minutes to whistle up the lineman from his cozy little den under the box, get the cover off the locks and give the release.