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| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 00:28 #55856 | |
maxand
1637 posts |
Quote:I urge you to read the report as this would have answered your questions for youIt would have helped if you posted a working link to save us all some time. Anyway, here is the main page (now in the National Archives), containing links to a number of reports all relating to this incident, and here a link to the final Report of the HSE investigation From it I learned: 1) Both drivers were among those killed in the crash, a fact not mentioned in the TV show. 2) Quote: Section 2.5 - Mr Hodder (driver of Thames Turbo 165 train) was not an experienced driver, having only qualified as a driver 13 days prior to the incident. 3) Quote: Section 3.6 Immediately before the collision, the signaller...realised (from an audible alarm and a visual display indicating a track circuit being occupied by a train "out of sequence"So track circuits were actually being used at the time, and the TV episode used a fake IECC panel. More detail on ARS and signaller issues may be found in Section 10. The PDF document is copy-protected so I'll leave it to you guys to read it up. (added) I did not see GeoffM's post before submitting this. Last edited: 20/02/2014 at 00:35 by maxand Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 00:42 #55857 | |
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AndyG
1842 posts |
Quote:.... TV show.....says it all really. "Drama-documentaries" are a contradiction of terms. I can only help one person a day. Today's not your day. Tomorrow doesn't look too good either. Last edited: 20/02/2014 at 00:45 by AndyG Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 08:59 #55865 | |
jc92
3690 posts |
" said:Quote:I urge you to read the report as this would have answered your questions for youIt would have helped if you posted a working link to save us all some time. I imagine it was working when posted and has since been removed. quote="maxand" post=55856]Quote:
quote] only a partial contributory factor, given SN109 was SPADed or near SPADed on several occasions by highly experienced drivers anyway. "We don't stop camborne wednesdays" Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 14:12 #55876 | |
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Stephen Fulcher
2084 posts |
The contributory factors to Ladbroke Grove were far more complex than the average person generally understands, some of which went back many years, and a couple could be traced to privatisation. It is a shame that the Government did not actually put their money where their mouth was when John Prescott said that money was no object with railway safety - if they had we would have ATP everywhere not TPWS, which although better than nothing (substantially better than nothing), it does have a few drawbacks. Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 15:14 #55878 | |
Steamer
3986 posts |
" said:It is a shame that the Government did not actually put their money where their mouth was when John Prescott said that money was no object with railway safety - if they had we would have ATP everywhere not TPWS, which although better than nothing (substantially better than nothing), it does have a few drawbacks.At the time though, ATP wasn't as good a solution as it was made out to be, and had its own drawbacks. For example, if a signal stepped up to a more permissive aspect, the driver had to continue braking until the train passes an ATP beacon, causing delays. TPWS provided 70% of the benefit, cost less than ATP and was in widespread use by 2003. "Don't stress/ relax/ let life roll off your backs./ Except for death and paying taxes/ everything in life.../ is only for now." (Avenue Q) Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 15:43 #55879 | |
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Stephen Fulcher
2084 posts |
Some systems behave like this, but it would not have taken much to develop one which had continuous coverage, as has been done since. At least ATP is fail safe, unlike TPWS.
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| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 21:38 #55890 | |
ozrail
197 posts |
The CSR Train Radio system is the same as used in Sydney Australia. In fact the number 10 is added to the front of our four stock numbers to meet the six numbers used in the UK standards and software. Here it's called "Metronet" and when an Stop-Stop-Stop or All-Stop message is sent the first thing the driver sees is a "Restricted Speed" message displayed on the radio and an audible alarm. When the driver acknowledges the message it then displays the Stop message. I don't know if CSR goes through the same process when sending a message, but would like to know. Incidentally, I noticed in the LUL timetables testing of the All-Stop function is allowed for in the early mornings. I always thought it was a good idea to test the system and become used to this function in an emergency. Last edited: 20/02/2014 at 21:39 by ozrail Log in to reply |
that the 165 train had passed signal SN109 at red and was heading towards the Up Main Line on which the HST was approaching.