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| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 12/10/2011 at 20:49 #21705 | |
SID.GRAY1
3 posts |
Hi There,I recently watched Seconds From Disaster on sky,it told the story about how the driver of a down dmu crossed into the path of an up HST after a SPAD.The fault was traced to a badly sighted signal but how did the dmu manage to pass through the points which surely must have been unable to be set if the signal was set at danger.
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| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 12/10/2011 at 20:52 #21706 | |
jc92
3690 posts |
the points would have been set from a previous movement and left in that position
"We don't stop camborne wednesdays" Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 12/10/2011 at 21:09 #21708 | |
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SID.GRAY1
3 posts |
Thanks JC,as you can see I`m a novice to signalling,many people asked me this question on the night and I couldn`t fathom it so thanks again.
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| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 12/10/2011 at 21:26 #21709 | |
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TomOF
452 posts |
A hefty read, but the offical report can be found here. http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/incident-ladbrokegrove-lgri1-optim.pdf Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 12/10/2011 at 21:34 #21710 | |
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Firefly
521 posts |
Yep, the track layout was such that multiple lines were reducing down to 4. The points had to be set one way or the other and either way could have lead the train into the path of an opposite direction train. 
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| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 06:23 #21714 | |
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pilotman
189 posts |
Of course the trailing points at the end of the "illegal" route were set against the demu, but in these circumstances a train will usually burst through those. They would be damaged and so would the train bogie probably, but in view of the ensuing mayhem that would be the least of your worries.
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| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 07:00 #21715 | |
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clive
2789 posts |
"either way could have led the train into the path of an opposite direction train" Not quite. One setting of the points led through a long link to an opposing direction line. The other setting led through a much shorter crossover to a line running in the same direction. At the time the layout was designed, a risk analysis was done and concluded that the balance of risk lay in leaving the points set for the first case - while a head-on collision (as happened) is more serious, it was much less likely (because the driver would have plenty of time to stop after a SPAD) than a sideline collision on the Down Relief. There wasn't room for the third option of trap points. If you put "51.52468,-0.215" into Google Earth or Google Maps and zoom in, you'll see the crossover to the Down Relief. You can then trace the link to the Up Main and see how long it is by comparison. Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 16:14 #21718 | |
Steamer
3986 posts |
I would be very dubious about information form Documentries- they are written purely for a SHOCK! SHOCK! factor, and don't examine an accident from a scientific/technical viewpoint. For more accurate information, Stanley Hall discusses the accident in good detail in his book Beyond Hidden Dangers, and there will probably be other webistes that give a more reliable account of the ins and outs.
"Don't stress/ relax/ let life roll off your backs./ Except for death and paying taxes/ everything in life.../ is only for now." (Avenue Q) Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 16:55 #21723 | |
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pilotman
189 posts |
I disagree. Most news reports at the time are not worth a light, but a good documentary is not looking for shock - ity's too far after the event. It educates Joe Public that a safe railway costs money - TPWS for example.
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| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 19:30 #21744 | |
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casey jones
72 posts |
A day i will never forget in my life and changed the railways for the better i have driven over that route for 16yrs never a day goes by when i think of the loss of the souls on that tragic day i new both drivers as well RIP mick Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 19:59 #21745 | |
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Firefly
521 posts |
Quote:Much the same as Clapham. I was still at school when that happened and I remember hearing it on the news since our Tech Drawing teacher used to have the radio on. Clapham had a massive impact on the S & T department. In my opinion every S & T technician and manager should read the Clapham report to ensure that yesterdays mistakes are not repeated. FF Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 20:39 #21751 | |
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Lardybiker
771 posts |
I've got two books on rail "incidents" in the UK. The first I forget the name but its got all sorts of incidents dating right back to the beginning of the railways including the biggest accident in British railway history at Quintishill. The other one is called "Tracks to Disaster" and has information on a number of relatively up to date incidents dating back only as far as about 1970. Both Clapham and Ladbrooke Grove are in it. I certainly agree with Firefly about Clapham though. A lesson in how not to do it. Last edited: 13/10/2011 at 20:40 by Lardybiker Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 13/10/2011 at 20:41 #21752 | |
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jc92
3690 posts |
" said:I've got two books on rail "incidents" in the UK. The first I forget the name but its got all sorts of incidents dating right back to the beginning of the railways including the biggest accident in British railway history at Quintishill. The other one is called "Tracks to Disaster" and has information on a number of relatively up to date incidents dating back only as far as about 1970. Both Clapham and Ladbrooke Grove are in it.is the first one red for danger by any chance? "We don't stop camborne wednesdays" Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 14/10/2011 at 14:22 #21768 | |
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GB
64 posts |
" said:"either way could have led the train into the path of an opposite direction train"So in actual fact the second crossover to the down relief shown in that BBC diagram is non existant? I imagine also that having the flank protection would have had a more resrictive impact on signalling trains on the down relief Last edited: 14/10/2011 at 14:26 by GB Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 14/10/2011 at 17:55 #21781 | |
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Steamer
3986 posts |
GB- both sets exist, although according to the diagram in Beyond Hidden Dangers, they are within the first Track Circuit beyond SN109, and so would have been locked when the train passed. Also shown is that the Overlap for SN109 ends somewhere between the points between Line 3 and Line 2, and the second set to the down relief.
"Don't stress/ relax/ let life roll off your backs./ Except for death and paying taxes/ everything in life.../ is only for now." (Avenue Q) Log in to reply |
| Re: Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 16/10/2011 at 16:22 #21817 | |
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SID.GRAY1
3 posts |
Thankyou everyone for your for your input,I by no means intended to bring up sad memories,but it does help people like me to understand these situations better,thanks again everyone.
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| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 21:03 #55830 | |
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maxand
1637 posts |
I recently watched Seconds From Disaster S04E03 - Paddington Rail Disaster on Australian ABC TV (still available on iView). Incidentally, it's not Ladbrooke Grove but Ladbroke Grove, which may assist those searching for it in this forum. You can also view the video here: [video]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGDHYDDdurY[/video] Very similar to Air Crash Investigations (aka Mayday in US) it succeeds in titillating the viewer craving CGI footage of animated destruction repeated ad nauseam while frightening those with travel phobia. You will be reassured by the improvements made subsequently to prevent this from ever happening again (?), and given a chance to gloat over the punishment meted out to those found responsible. What intrigued me, however, was that at 5:15 in the video we see the signallers at work in the Slough New Signal Box and at 5:18 a closeup of the screen, showing a moving red strip as the driver of the Thames Turbo went through Signal 109. This scene is replayed several times more, with more detail at 35:56 as the police begin interviewing the signallers. It turns out that they could have sent a visual STOP! warning to the drivers of each train in time, but either didn't or the warning arrived too late. Unfortunately the link to the official report in post #4 of this thread is now dead, but it doesn't really matter here. 1) This happened way back in 1999, yet the IECC panel shows the signaller following the driver through the SPAD. We can actually see the train (red strip) move. No "stop-motion" track circuits here, as we get in SimSig. So, where are the signallers getting their real time train location information? Is this video a fake, did they really have GPS back then, or did they use some other means? 2) I didn't think signallers could send an order directly to drivers like this. Calling them up on a mobile, maybe. Obviously this system is far more advanced than SimSig. So is it possible to incorporate either of these features into our "old" simulator? 
Last edited: 19/02/2014 at 22:02 by maxand Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 21:09 #55831 | |
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Stephen Fulcher
2084 posts |
Slough New IECC was equipped with Cab Secure Radio which was fitted where driver only operation is allowed. This is a system where the signalman can call up any train wherever it is, and can tell where each train is on the radio system. There is a facility to send an emergency call to any one, or all drivers within the area. It is essentially an older version of GSM-R which is in use today, and CSR is also still in use in some areas. They could also have hit the ESOC (emergency signals on control) for the interlocking concerned, which would effectively crash the SSI interlocking, causing the trackside modules to lose communications with it and thereby replace all signals to red. Log in to reply The following user said thank you: maxand |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 21:11 #55832 | |
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sloppyjag
480 posts |
1) Not an expert but I reckon a bit of poetic license has been used.
Planotransitophobic! Last edited: 19/02/2014 at 21:12 by sloppyjag Log in to reply |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 21:11 #55833 | |
headshot119
4869 posts |
Simsig is representative of real IECCS and signalboxes, I know of no system in the UK that can show a trains "exact" position in real time, or than that it is "somewhere" on a track circuit. I would therefore conclude the video is a fake! Signalers at the time, could request an NRN radio, or CSR (Not sure if CSR can be done directly from the signalbox NRN certainly can't)(I'm not sure I'd describe either as particularly visual) emergency stop message via network control, I don't believe it could be done directly. With the advent of GSMR it is now possible for a signaler to directly send an all trains stop message. "Passengers for New Lane, should be seated in the rear coach of the train " - Opinions are my own and not those of my employer Last edited: 19/02/2014 at 21:12 by headshot119 Log in to reply The following user said thank you: maxand |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 22:00 #55839 | |
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mfcooper
707 posts |
Slough IECC That isn't Slough (new) IECC. That is more-than-likely some mock-up made for this TV show. See here for some photos of Slough New. It doesn't look like a UK signalling system - that Trackerball unit looks all wrong. We don't have light-up buttons, AFAIK. I seem to recall having a conversation with a Slough IECC signaller years ago (no idea if he was on duty) in which he stated that the signaller tried to swing the points when they saw what was happening, but the Turbo stepped into the Track Circuit locking the points just a fraction ahead of the signallers point-swing command. We didn't talk about any use of a radio system, but I believe the time between the Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD) to the collision wasn't as long as the video implies. Radio Systems NRN calls can be instigated by drivers or Operations Control between each other. If a signaller needed to contact a driver, they had to get Ops Control to contact the driver, and then get the driver to use a Signal Post Telephone (SPT) [or perhaps mobile phone] to speak to the signaller. If the driver wanted to speak to the signaller, they would radio Ops Control who would forward the radio call on via the telephone. It's a weird experience using radio protocols whilst using a phone. CSR is only within a signal box, and has no input from Operations Control. There is a function to stop every train in a CSR Area (almost always the same as each Signal Box/Panel/Workstation control area) called "General Stop". However, not every signal box has/had CSR, and neither did every train. With the introduction of GSM-R, the long-term aim is that every train wil be fitted. GSM-R is predominantly for contact between Drivers and Signallers. However, Ops Control have a GSM-R terminal where they can listen to emergency calls. GSM-R can also be used for signallers to contact other signal boxes, etc. Currently, at my workplace, trains either have CSR or GSM-R. (Which system do you send the stop message to, first?) NRN in Southern England was switched off recently when the broadcasting frequencies were passed back to the Army. Now every train must have one of the 2 radio systems. New instals are all GSM-R, and CSR is on a rolling program of replacement. The "Stop" messages are also different. With CSR a signaller could send a text-based message to every train in an emergency to stop - "General Stop" - and then use their phone/radio to deal with an emergency call elsewhere (perhaps to the Ambulance service). They could also send "Stop" to one train in a similar manner. With GSM-R, however, there is no text-based message - one must start an emergency voice call to all drivers in the GSM-R Area. A signaller can use an "Urgent Call" to contact one driver, but this doesn't have the same rules and regulations about drivers stopping immidiately. NB: NRN = National Radio Network. CSR = Cab Secure Radio. GSM-R = Global System for Mobile Communications - Railway. See: Wikipedia Last edited: 20/02/2014 at 00:08 by mfcooper Reason: typo Log in to reply The following user said thank you: maxand |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 22:10 #55840 | |
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Steamer
3986 posts |
There's a (slightly blurry) picture here of the Slough IECC training simulator, showing a detailed view of the Ladbroke Grove area. SN109 signal can be seen in the centre of the picture on the third line from the bottom. On the far left of the screen, 1P21 is approaching SN120 and the set of points around which the collision occurred. As you can see, this is essentially the same as you get in SimSig, except with track circuit and signal names shown. Although there was a facility to send an emergency stop message, it's worth remembering that the window of opportunity was small- there was a period of 18 seconds during which an emergency brake application could have stopped the train clear*. In that time, the following would have to occur: Signaller reacting, signaller sending message, message transmitted, message received, driver reacting to message, brakes reacting to controller. It's a fairly tall order, given that the signaller might have been occupied elsewhere in the area. In the event, the Stop command was sent, however it's unknown whether or not it was received before the collision. *(Stanley Hall, Beyond Hidden Dangers) "Don't stress/ relax/ let life roll off your backs./ Except for death and paying taxes/ everything in life.../ is only for now." (Avenue Q) Last edited: 19/02/2014 at 22:12 by Steamer Log in to reply The following user said thank you: maxand |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 22:25 #55841 | |
KymriskaDraken
963 posts |
I like the way that they even faked the signal clearing at Paddington. At 4'40" it goes from red, to red, to another red.
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| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 19/02/2014 at 23:17 #55848 | |
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TomOF
452 posts |
" said:I urge you to read the report as this would have answered your questions for you. I have previously recorded my less than complimentary thoughts on this and a similar programme both of which gave the impression that the signallers had far more information available to them than was really the case. It does the signallers involved an injustice. If they had super detailed screens with split second updates they would probably have spotted that the train was going too fast to stop and was about to pass SN109 at danger. This was always going to happen eventually in a complex location with poor signal sighting and it's a shame that it took a disaster of this magnitude for the railway authorities to get serious about the effects of passing signals at danger - hence the introduction of TPWS which won't prevent all accidents but will do a damn sight more to mitigate the effects of a mistake. A more pro-active approach would have seen this developed sooner. As a slight aside I notice many of the outdoor railway shots appears to be on Swindon Panel's patch... Last edited: 19/02/2014 at 23:19 by TomOF Reason: Added a few things Log in to reply The following users said thank you: maxand, UKTrainMan |
| Ladbrooke Grove Incident. 20/02/2014 at 00:25 #55855 | |
GeoffM
6377 posts |
To emphasise a couple of things: with NRN it would have taken longer than the quoted 18 seconds to set up the call. Even with CSR, if a general stop was issued, it may still have taken too long as it broadcasts the stop to each sub area in turn rather than all at once. As for the moving trains on the signaller's display - pure Hollywood fiction! 
SimSig Boss Last edited: 20/02/2014 at 00:28 by GeoffM Log in to reply The following user said thank you: maxand |
