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A similar derailment occurred at the same location on Wednesday 2 April 2014 (paragraph 102)

And for anyone else having a feeling of deja vu:
Quote:

A similar derailment occurred at the same location on Wednesday 2 April 2014 (paragraph 102)

(RAIB Report 11/2015)

RAIB has today released its report into a freight train collision near Logan, East Ayrshire, 1 August 2015.

R132016_Logan.pdf

Also how "at caution" allows for stopping within full range of vision up to 40mph instead of half vision up to 20mph

Is it possible to have trains operate on the track adjacent to where work is being performed at maximum authorized speed?

" said:

RAIB has today released its report into a freight train collision near Logan, East Ayrshire, 1 August 2015.

R132016_Logan.pdf

Having both possessions and work-sites as separate things is interesting. Also how "at caution" allows for stopping within full range of vision up to 40mph instead of half vision up to 20mph and that a train could be allowed to operate at such speed with an obstruction ahead. Is it possible to have trains operate on the track adjacent to where work is being performed at maximum authorized speed?

" said:

Is it possible to have trains operate on the track adjacent to where work is being performed at maximum authorized speed?

Where there's a reasonable gap between Fast and Slow/Relief lines, it's quite possible to have major work taking place on one set with trains running on the other. Not sure what the speed limit situation is- presumably it depends on the distance between the lines and the prevailing maximum speed limit on the open line. In addition, some types of maintenance/inspections take place with the line open normally and lookouts protecting the staff on the track. I'm not sure what the limits are on working on one track of a double-track line and running bi-di over the other.

What's up with the continued use of detonators? Not only are they labour intensive to remove and apply after every train, they are generally ineffective due to modern cab-soundproofing standards. In the United States they almost completely vanished after they because an employee liability issue regarding misuse.

The only way a train would explode a det (apart from in an emergency) is if a semaphore Distant signal is being shot by a Handsignalman during fog or falling snow - and I am not sure if that practice still survives.

" said:

" said:

RAIB has today released its report into a freight train collision near Logan, East Ayrshire, 1 August 2015.

R132016_Logan.pdf

Having both possessions and work-sites as separate things is interesting. Also how "at caution" allows for stopping within full range of vision up to 40mph instead of half vision up to 20mph and that a train could be allowed to operate at such speed with an obstruction ahead. Is it possible to have trains operate on the track adjacent to where work is being performed at maximum authorized speed?

It's all to do with where the Person In Charge Of The Possession (called the PICOP) can place his detonators to protect the possession. Almost always the detonators are placed just in advance of a signal at the start of the possession and just in rear of a signal at the other end. Now, the two signals can be miles apart, but the worksite(s) can be fairly close together. For example there could be a team changing a rail in one place, and half a mile away there is another team digging ballast.

" said:

" said:

" said:

RAIB has today released its report into a freight train collision near Logan, East Ayrshire, 1 August 2015.

R132016_Logan.pdf

Having both possessions and work-sites as separate things is interesting. Also how "at caution" allows for stopping within full range of vision up to 40mph instead of half vision up to 20mph and that a train could be allowed to operate at such speed with an obstruction ahead. Is it possible to have trains operate on the track adjacent to where work is being performed at maximum authorized speed?

It's all to do with where the Person In Charge Of The Possession (called the PICOP) can place his detonators to protect the possession. Almost always the detonators are placed just in advance of a signal at the start of the possession and just in rear of a signal at the other end. Now, the two signals can be miles apart, but the worksite(s) can be fairly close together. For example there could be a team changing a rail in one place, and half a mile away there is another team digging ballast.

Kev.

I think you'll find that for a T3, standard detonator protection is 400 metres beyond the protecting signal and 400 metres on the approach to the controlled signal immediately beyond the possession limits. Although I will agree that in many cases sub-standard protection is used where the distance is less than 400 metres.

Mike